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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF RENT
REGULATION UNDER FIRREA
I. Introduction
During the 1980's, hundreds of savings and loans ("S & L's") be-
came insolvent, threatening the continued health and viability of the
industry.' Since accounts at most failed S & L's were insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") for all
amounts up to $100,000, the failure of S & L's forced the Federal
Government to pay out billions of dollars to the depositors of these
institutions.'
In response to the crisis, Congress enacted the Federal Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") on
August 9, 1989. 3 The primary purposes of FIRREA are to supply
affordable housing mortgage finance and housing opportunities for
low- and moderate-income individuals; to ensure a well-funded, in-
dependent thrift insurance fund;4 to establish organizations and pro-
cedures to procure and administer funding for resolving thrift failures;
and to dispose of the assets of failed institutions.5 FIRREA confers
broad authority on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") and the newly created Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC") (referred to collectively as the "Corporation") to manage
and dispose of the assets of failed thrifts6 in an expeditious and eco-
nomical manner.7 Since RTC was a new entity, FDIC was empow-
ered to act on its behalf until RTC was able to perform its duties.
1. Smallwood v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 925 F.2d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 1991); see
generally Robert J. Laughlin, Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (1991); Ryan Addresses Outlook For RTC Funding, Some Hot
Issues Facing Thrift Industry, 59 BANKING REP. 309, Aug. 31, 1992 (available in
Westlaw, BNA Library) (between 1989 and August 31, 1992, 720 thrifts became insol-
vent due to poor earnings and low capital).
2. Smallwood, 925 F.2d at 897.
3. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
4. FIRREA replaced the FSLIC with the Savings Associations Insurance Fund,
which collects deposit insurance premiums to cover savings association insovencies. See
12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a) (West Supp. IV 1993); Anne M. Taylor, Note, The FDIC's En-
hanced Powers Over Savings Associations: Does FIRREA Make It SAIF, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 381 (1991).
5. See Laughlin, supra note 1, at 311-12.
6. One of a number of types of mutually owned, cooperative, savings associations,
originally established for the primary purpose of making loans to members and others,
usually for the purchase of real estate or homes. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1343
(6th ed. 1990).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 411 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 207 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
939
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XX
Thereafter, FDIC was to act as RTC's manager.'
The Corporation can manage and dispose of a distressed thrift's
assets in its capacity as conservator 9 or as receiver' ° . When appointed
conservator, the Corporation is authorized to take the necessary steps
to restore a thrift to sound financial condition." When appointed re-
ceiver, the Corporation supervises the liquidation of an insolvent insti-
tution's assets.' 2 In either capacity, the Corporation is instructed by
statute to maximize returns from the liquidation of institutions with-
out overly disrupting local markets and to maintain an affordable sup-
ply of low- and moderate-income housing.' a
RTC and FDIC possess the same rights and powers when acting in
their respective capacities as conservators or receivers of failed institu-
tions.' 4 These powers and rights include the ability to disaffirm or
repudiate any lease that the Corporation deems to be "burden-
8. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. IV 1993). The FDIC's Board of Di-
rectors acts as RTC's Board of Directors. FDIC's Chairman acts as RTC's Chairman.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st Congress, 1st Sess. 411 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 450.
9. A preserver appointed by a court to manage the affairs of an entity which is un-
able to manage its property and business affairs effectively. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
306 (6th ed. 1990).
10. An entity appointed by a court to receive and preserve a debtors's property pend-
ing an action against it, or applying the property and/or its rents, issues and profits in
satisfaction of a creditor's claim, whenever there is danger that, in the absence of such
appointment, the property will be lost, removed or injured. Id. at 1268.
11. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 86, 310-11.
12. Id.
13. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(3)(C) (West Supp. IV 1993) instructs the Corporation to
conduct its operations in a manner which:
(i) maximizes the net present value return from the sale or other disposition of
institutions... or the assets of such institutions;
(ii) minimizes the impact of such transactions on local real estate and financial
markets;
(iii) makes efficient use of funds obtained from the Funding Corporation or
from the Treasury;
(iv) minimizes the amount of any loss realized in the resolution of cases; and
(v) maximizes the preservation of the availability and affordability of residen-
tial real property for low- and moderate-income individuals.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a (b)(l)(B) (West Supp. IV 1993) provides:
[RTC], when it is acting as a conservator or receiver of an insured depository
institution, shall be deemed to be an agency of the United States to the same
extent as the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation when it is acting as a
conservator or receiver of an insured depository institution.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(1) (West Supp. IV 1993) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, the law of any State, or the
Constitution of any State, the Corporation may accept appointment and act as
conservator or receiver for any insured depository institution upon appointment
in the manner provided ...
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some."1I- FIRREA provides that the Corporation is not subject to the
"direction or supervision" of any state in the exercise of its "rights,
powers or privileges."16 Taken together, these factors raise an issue
regarding the Corporation's authority to preempt state and local rent
regulations.
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond, 7 Judge Carter of the United
States Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that state
and local rent regulation of apartments is not preempted by FIRREA.
In arriving at this decision, the court failed to consider that the apart-
ments were probably not even occupied by low- or moderate-income
tenants. '
8
The deleterious impact of the restriction on the Corporation's pow-
ers caused by the Diamond decision' 9 must be analyzed in light of the
Congressional Budget Office's estimation that the cost of past thrift
resolutions, current conservatorships, and additional projected thrift
failures will total $180 billion and will be paid almost entirely by
taxpayers.2" Diamond's failure to recognize the expansive nature of
FIRREA's powers forces the Corporation to comply with local regu-
lations that obstruct the liquidation of assets from failed banks.
Although such a ruling benefits the tenants occupying the rent regu-
lated units at issue (higher income tenants in the case of Diamond2),
15. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e)(1) (West Supp. IV 1993) provides:
Provisions relating to contracts entered into before appointment of conservator
or receiver-
(1) Authority to repudiate contracts.... In addition to any other rights a con-
servator or receiver may have, the conservator or receiver for any insured de-
pository institution may disaffirm or repudiate any contract or lease...
(A) to which such institution is a party;
(B) the performance of which the conservator or receiver, in the conservator's
or receiver's discretion, determines to be burdensome; and
(C) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which the conservator or receiver deter-
mines, in the conservator's or receiver's discretion, will promote the orderly
administration of the institution's affairs.
16. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. IV 1993) provides:
When acting as conservator or receiver pursuant to an appointment [to act as
Conservator or Receiver] . . ., the Corporation shall not be subject to the direc-
tion or supervision of any other agency or department of the United States or
any State in the exercise of the Corporation's rights, powers or privileges.
17. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
18. The building at issue was a luxury complex. None of the tenants in the units
provided any evidence that they were low- or moderate-income individuals. Id. at 1160-
61.
19. 801 F. Supp. 1152.
20. Total Thrift Crisis Cleanup Will Cost Taxpayers $180 Billion, CBO Estimates, 60
BANKING REP. 767, May 24, 1993, available in Westlaw, BNA Library.
21. The term "higher income tenant" is used to refer to those tenants who earn more
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it impedes the replenishment of the insurance fund.22 Taxpayers ulti-
mately pay for the shortfall.
This Note takes the position that Diamond was wrongly decided.
Part II of this Note reviews rent regulation in New York City and the
basis of its conflict with FIRREA.23 Part III introduces the preemp-
tion doctrine and discusses the Diamond case. Part IV analyzes the
legal and policy arguments supporting federal preemption of rent reg-
ulation under FIRREA. Part V concludes that the plain language of
FIRREA, prior caselaw, and public policy favor allowing the Corpo-
ration to disaffirm rent controlled or stabilized leases occupied by
higher-income tenants.24
II. Rent Regulations in New York City
The Federal Emergency Price Control Act of 194225 imposed rent
control on a national scale in response to wartime housing emergen-
cies.2 1 Although federal controls had expired by 1953, approximately
ten percent of the rental housing units in the United States (2.8 mil-
lion units) remain subject to state or local rent controls. 27 Rent con-
trol currently exists in New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts,
Maryland, Connecticut, California, and the District of Columbia. 28
Rent controlled units are predominantly found in major urban
centers.29
In 1946, the New York State Legislature extended rent control in
response to a continuing shortage of affordable housing faced by an
expanding population.30 Initially, rent control was intended only as a
than those in the low- or moderate-income categories, as defined by the RTC. See infra
note 133.
22. See supra note 4.
23. Diamond was a case of first impression regarding the preemmption of rent regula-
tions under FIRREA. Due to the intricate nature of New York's rent regulations, the
reasoning set forth herein is applicable to rent regulations throughout America.
24. Although this Note deals specifically with the applicability of 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1821(c)(2)(C) to rent regulated properties, it also raises the broader question as to the
limits to which § 1821(c)(2)(C) can be applied to other state regulations.
25. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
26. Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, §§ 1-2, 056 Stat. at 23-25. OFFICE OF POL-
icy DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON RENT CONTROL 3 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter RENT CONTROL REPORT].
27. RENT CONTROL REPORT, supra note 26.
28. Id. at 4 (stating that New York City has 39 percent of all rent controlled units in
the United States; Los Angeles has 17 percent).
29. Id.
30. Although federal controls had not expired, the New York State Legislature en-
acted the Act of March 30, 1946 to provide for the continuation of rent control after
federal controls had lapsed. The Act provided:
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temporary measure, to be repealed upon the legislature's determina-
tion that the housing emergency had ceased to exist.31 In 1962, New
York City, pursuant to state legislative authority,32 further extended
rent control by enacting the City Rent and Rehabilitation Law
("CRRL"), 33 which gave tenants a statutory right to occupancy in
addition to their leasehold rights.34 CRRL applies rent control to
buildings built before February 1947 and whose tenants were in occu-
pancy prior to July 1, 1971. 31
In order to protect those exposed to a chronic housing shortage but
not protected by rent control, New York City also enacted rent stabi-
lization regulations.3 6 Rent stabilization was originally intended to be
a gradual phase out of rent control - once rent controlled apart-
ments were vacated they would become subject to rent stabilization.37
Generally, rent stabilization applies to leases entered into after July
1971 in buildings built before 1947, and in all dwelling units in build-
ings of six or more units built between 1947 and 1974 that were not
The legislature hereby finds that a serious public emergency exists in the
housing of a considerable number of persons in the State of New York which
emergency has been created by war, the effects of war and the aftermath of
hostilities; that such emergency has necessitated the intervention of the federal
government in order to prevent speculative, unwarranted and abnormal in-
creases in rents; that such emergency has produced an acute shortage in dwell-
ings ... ; that unless [the current federal rent control law] be renewed and such
regulation and control be continued, disruptive practices and abnormal condi-
tions will produce serious threats to the public health, safety and general wel-
fare; that to prevent such perils . . . preventive action by the legislature is
imperative ....
Act of March 30, 1946, ch. 274, § 1, 1946 N.Y. Laws 723, 723.
31. Id.
32. The Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Act, which was passed by the New
York State Legislature in 1962, granted cities with populations in excess of one million
the right to enact local rent control legislation. Local Emergency Housing Rent Control
Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8602-03 (McKinney 1987).
33. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 26-401 (1985) [hereinafter N.Y.C. AD-
MIN. CODE].
34. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, § 26-408(a) provides that:
No tenant, so long as he or she continues to pay the rent to which the land-
lord is entitled, shall be removed from any housing accommodation which is
subject to rent control under this chapter by action to evict or recover posses-
sion , by exclusion from possession, or otherwise, nor shall any person attempt
such removal or exclusion from possession notwithstanding the fact that the
tenant has no lease or that his or her lease, or other rental agreement, has ex-
pired or otherwise terminated.
Id. § 26-468(a).
35. Id. § 26- 403e.
36. A limited form of rent stabilization was instituted in New York City in 1969 and
was expanded in 1974. Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS § 8623 (McKinney 1987).
37. Id.
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originally rent controlled.3" New York City's rent stabilization laws
established a Rent Guidelines Board 39 to set a maximum allowable
yearly rent increase,4° as opposed to the static rent ceiling imposed by
rent control laws.
Prior to 1993, no income limitations applied to New York's rent
controlled units. Effective October 1, 1993, all luxury units with
monthly rents of two thousand dollars or more and occupied by ten-
ants earning a combined income of over two hundred and fifty thou-
sand dollars were decontrolled.4' This limitation, however, does not
affect all higher income tenants in possession of rent controlled
units.42
Rent regulation, where applicable, has drastically affected the land-
lord/tenant relationship. It is unclear whether rent regulation effec-
tively imposes a new relationship on the landlord that escapes
regulation by federal statutes aimed at the underlying leasehold
relationship.
III. The Federal Preemption Doctrine and the Diamond Case
No clear consensus exists as to whether Congress intended for the
Corporation's lease disaffirmance powers to cover rent regulated
leases.43 Although FIRREA expressly grants the Corporation the
power to preempt 44 conflicting state regulations," in Diamond the
federal district court for the Southern District of New York ques-
38. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, supra note 33, § 26-504. Exceptions exist, but they are
not relevant to this discussion.
39. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, supra note 33, § 26-510.
40. Id.
41. Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993, ch. 253, § 2, 1993 N.Y. LAWS 675
(McKinney 1993) (amending Act of March 30, 1946, ch. 274, 1946 N.Y. LAWS 723)
42. The term "higher income tenant" refers to a family or individual whose income
exceeds 115% of the median income in the area involved, as determined by the U.S.
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. See supra note 22. In New York, the
relevant area is comprised of Bronx, Kings, New York, Putnam, Queens, Richmond, and
Rockland counties. U.S. DEP'T OF HouS. AND URBAN DEv., STATE LIST OF PRIMARY
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AND METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS (March 22,
1993). In the New York area, the median income is $41,700. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND
URBAN DEV., TRANSMITTAL OF 1993 INCOME LIMITS FOR LOW-INCOME AND VERY
LOW-INCOME FAMILIES UNDER THE HOUSING ACT OF 1937 (March 22, 1993). Thus,
there remains a large class of higher income, rent controlled tenants who do not meet the
luxury decontrol requirements.
43. The only court to address this issue to date has been the Southern District of New
York in the Diamond case. 801 F. Supp. 1152.
44. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
45. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(C). For the text of § 1821(c)(2)(C), see supra note
[Vol. XX
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tioned the scope of this power.46
A. The Federal Preemption Doctrine
The Supremacy Clause 47 empowers Congress to preempt state
law.48 Preemption can occur in several ways. Express preemption
occurs when Congress explicitly states its intent to preempt state
law.49 If this intent is not explicitly stated, preemption occurs when
state law conflicts with federal law5" ("conflict preemption") or when
federal law so "thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to sup-
plement it'" ("field preemption"). 5  Conflict preemption can be
further broken down into two distinct sub-types: 1) compliance with
both federal and state law is a "physical impossibility,"52 and 2) state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 3
B. The Diamond Case
In Diamond,5 4 RTC, acting as receiver of Nassau Federal Savings
and Loan Association, acquired nine rent regulated condominium
leases in a luxury apartment building55 located in Manhattan.5 6 RTC
sought to repudiate these leases pursuant to its lease disaffirmance
powers5 7 and asserted that FIRREA preempted5" any state regula-
tions that were inconsistent with such powers. 9 The New York State
Attorney General successfully challenged RTC's power to preempt
46. See infra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides, in pertinent part, that "the Laws of the
United States which shall be made.., under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the Supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding."
48. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 476 U.S.
355, 368 (1986).
49. Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
50. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992).
51. Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
52. Louisiana Pub. Sery. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 368 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)).
53. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
54. 801 F. Supp. 1152.
55. See supra note 18.
56. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1154-55.
57. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e)(1). For the text of § 1821(e)(1), see supra note 15.
58. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(C). For the text of § 1821(c)(2)(C), see supra note
16.
59. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1154-55.
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state rent regulations. 6°
Judge Carter, who wrote the Diamond opinion, reasoned that
RTC's authority to preempt state law 6' existed only for those powers
expressly delegated to RTC under FIRREA.62 Since FIRREA con-
tains no provisions specifically granting RTC the power to preempt
rent regulations, the court held that RTC could not repudiate statu-
tory tenancies.63
To support its reasoning, the court analogized the powers of a
trustee in bankruptcy under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code 6 to
the Corporation's lease disaffirmance powers.65 The court cited a
Southern District Bankruptcy Court decision in which a trustee's
lease rejection powers under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code were
considered "suspect" as applied to rent regulated tenants because
such tenants held "statutory tenancies. ' 66 The Diamond court found
this reasoning applicable to RTC's powers under FIRREA.67
The Diamond court found a strong presumption against preemp-
tion of state law by federal statute because the regulations at issue
were within New York's traditional police powers. 6s The court stated
that the presumption could be overcome only if preemption was the
only permissible conclusion or if Congress had clearly expressed pre-
emptive intent.69
In interpreting Congress's intent behind the Corporation's lease
disaffirmance powers, the court looked to the instructions in
FIRREA. 70 Two of these instructions suggested to Judge Carter that
Congress had not intended for lease disaffirmance powers to apply to
statutory tenancies.7' One instruction required the Corporation to
minimize the market impact of its transactions." The court reasoned
that allowing RTC to repudiate all rent regulated tenancies under its
60. Id. at 1155.
61. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(C). For the text of § 1821(c)(2)(C), see supra note
16.
62. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1159.
63. Id.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1993). This section, entitled "Executory Contracts and
Unexpired Leases" states: "(a) ... the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may as-
sume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."
65. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1160.
66. In re Friarton Estates Corp., 65 B.R. 586 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
67. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1160.
68. Id. at 1155-57.
69. Id. at 1156.
70. Id. at 1160.
71. Id. at 1161-62.
72. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1161-62; 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(ii). For the text
of § 144la(b)(3)(C)(ii), see supra note 13.
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control would contravene this instruction, because repudiation would
have an adverse impact on the housing market. 73 The other instruc-
tion required the Corporation to maximize the preservation of afford-
able housing for low- and moderate-income individuals.74 Since
RTC's disaffirmance of rent regulated leases would remove the leases
from the market, repudiation would reduce the supply of affordable
housing available to low- or moderate-income individuals, thereby
contravening the latter instruction. Thus, the court concluded that
Congress did not expressly intend to preempt rent regulations."S
The Diamond court also rejected conflict preemption as a grounds
for federal preemption. 6 Judge Carter reasoned that since the Corpo-
ration did not possess the power to repudiate statutory tenancies, the
state's regulation of such tenancies did not conflict with the Corpora-
tion's powers or functions.77
The court read section 1821(j),7 s the provision prohibiting courts
from restraining the Corporation in the exercise of its powers or func-
tions, narrowly. Applying the same reasoning used to reject the con-
flict preemption issue - i.e., that the repudiation of a statutory
tenancy was not a "power or function" of RTC - the court found
section 1821(j) inapplicable.79 It determined that the provision was
at most a restraint on the ability of courts to interfere with RTC's
substantive decisions, but did not apply to RTC's statutory interpreta-
tions s.8  The court stated that the alternative to its interpretation of
section 1821(j) would bar judicial review of the Corporation's con-
struction of FIRREA'
IV. Preemption of Rent Regulation Under FIRREA
Rent control and rent stabilization laws exist only on the state and
local level. Thus, such laws may be preempted by federal law. As
73. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1161 (as of February 1991, the RTC controlled 1000
rent-regulated condominium and cooperative apartments in New York State).
74. Id. at 1161-62; 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(v). See supra note 13 for the text of
§ 144la(b)(3)(C)(v).
75. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1161, 1162 n.6.
76. Id. at 1162-64.
77. Id.
78. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(j) (West Supp. IV 1993) provides:
Except as provided in this section, no court may take any action, except at the
request of the Board of Directors, by regulation or by order, to restrain or affect
the exercise of powers or functions of the Corporation as a conservator or a
receiver.
79. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1160.
80. Id. at 1160.
81. Id.
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indicated earlier, the three types of preemption are express preemp-
tion, conflict preemption, and field preemption.82 Field preemption is
inapplicable to rent regulation because FIRREA does not provide for
any form of rent regulation. "Physical impossibility," a form of con-
flict preemption, is not an issue as both lease disaffirmance powers and
rent regulations can function simultaneously. Conflict preemption,
however, may still be applicable since, to the extent that New York's
rent regulations grant tenants statutory rights to their leases, the regu-
lations obstruct the accomplishment of Congress's purposes and
objectives in enacting FIRREA. s3
A. Express Preemption
Before examining the applicability of conflict preemption, a court
should consider whether the statutory language expressly preempts
state law.84
1. Statutory Language
In determining whether federal law is preemptive, the Supreme
Court has stated that courts must "give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." '85 The purpose behind the federal stat-
ute is the "touchstone" of preemption analysis.8 6 Therefore, to deter-
mine Congress's "plain purpose," a court must first look to the plain
language of the statute itself.87 There is a "strong presumption" that
the plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent;88 the
presumption is rebutted only where a contrary intent is "clearly
expressed."8 9
Congress has clearly expressed its intent to provide the Corpora-
tion, in its capacity as conservator or receiver, with preemption pow-
ers.90 Section 1821(c)(2)(C) provides that the Corporation shall not
be subject to the "direction or supervision" of "any State" in the exer-
82. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 4-7, 13; supra text accompanying note 5.
84. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
85. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1983).
86. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992).
87. Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1986);
MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S.
Ct. 459 (1991).
88. Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 112 S. Ct. 515, 520 (1991)
(quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
89. Id.
90. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(C). For the text of § 1821(c)(2)(C), see supra note
[Vol. XX
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cise of its "powers, functions, or privileges. "9.1 Furthermore, where
Congress intended for state law to apply, it was expressly provided
for.9
2
The statutory language of FIRREA provides no evidence that the
power to disaffirm "any lease" excludes rent regulated leases. The
term "lease" is defined as "any agreement which gives rise to [a] rela-
tionship of landlord and tenant or lessor and lessee."'93 Neither this
definition nor the statutory language of FIRREA indicate that a lease
ceases being a lease once it is subject to rent regulation or that such
regulations dissolve the landlord-tenant relationship arising from
"any agreement."
2. Lack of Contrary Intent
FIRREA's legislative history suggests that the statute does not dis-
tinguish between rent regulated leases and non-regulated leases. 94
Since the statute does not exclude rent regulated leases, the "strong
presumption" that such an exclusion was not intended controls. Fur-
thermore, the broad authority granted to the Corporation to deal with
the "monumental problems" and "unprecedented costs" of the sav-
ings and loan crisis favors an expansive interpretation of the term
91. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(C).
92. Congress has made special provisions for state law to govern in FIRREA. These
include: 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(13)(B) (West Supp. IV 1993):
(13) Additional Powers
In any case in which the Corporation is appointed conservator or receiver...
for any insured State depository institution...
(B) the Corporation shall apply the law of the State in which the institution is
chartered insofar as that law gives the claims of depositors priority over those of
other creditors or claimants;
12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(f)(3)(F) (West Supp. IV 1993):
(F) Other requirements not affected
This paragraph does not affect any other requirements under Federal or State
law for regulatory approval of an acquisition under this paragraph.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(f)(4)(D) (West Supp. IV 1993):
Any out-of-State bank holding company which acquires control of an insured
bank in any State . . . may acquire any other insured bank and establish
branches in such State to the same extent as a bank holding company whose
insured bank subsidiaries' operations are principally conducted in such state
may acquire any other insured bank or establish branches.
93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 889 (6th ed. 1990). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY has
been used to define statutory terms. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482
(1990).
94. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7. Proposed legislation aimed at requiring RTC
to conform to state and local law in the exercise of its lease repudiation powers has been
repeatedly rejected by Congress. See also H.R. 320, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.
121, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2244, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1692, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
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"lease.""
The Diamond court appropriately analogized the Corporation's
lease disaffirmance powers to those of a trustee in bankruptcy. 96 The
court, however, failed to make two distinctions between these two
provisions, which illustrate how Congress might have framed
FIRREA had it not intended for the Corporation's lease disaffirm-
ance powers to apply to rent regulated leases. First, section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code expressly subjects the trustee's lease rejection pow-
ers to the bankruptcy court's approval. 97 No such limitation exists in
FIRREA. 9 To the contrary, section 1821(j) forbids courts from re-
straining the Corporation in the exercise of its powers or functions. 99
Second, under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a lessee may
continue to occupy the premises even after the lease is rejected by the
trustee.'" FIRREA does not contain a similar provision. Since the
functions of a trustee in bankruptcy and those of a conservator or
receiver of a failed institution are similar,'01 Congress could easily
have used the Bankruptcy Code as a model and granted such a right
to a lessee in possession. Congress, however, recognized that the "in-
terests of the American taxpayers demand an expedited resolution" to
the crisis. 102 These interests outweigh the interests of a high income
tenant to the continued occupancy of a premises once the underlying
lease has been disaffirmed.
In Smallwood v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 03 the Sixth Circuit
found that FIRREA established federal authority as "paramount re-
garding the maintenance of the solvency of the federal deposit insur-
ance system."" There, the issue was whether FIRREA had pre-
empted state statutory requirements regarding the conversion of a
state-chartered savings and loan association to a federally-chartered
association. 05 The conversion was authorized by and performed in
95. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 308.
96. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e)(1). For the text of § 1821(e)(1), see supra note 15.
99. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(j). For the text of § 1821(j), see supra note 78.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1992) provides:
If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor under
which the debtor is the lessor .... the lessee ... may treat such lease ... as
terminated ... or, may remain in possession ... for the balance of such [lease]
term and for any renewal or extension of such term that is enforceable by such
lessee ... under applicable non-bankruptcy law.
101. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7.
102. Id.
103. Smallwood v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 925 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1991).
104. Id. at 898.
105. Id.
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accordance with FIRREA. " The court found that FIRREA pre-
empted °7 state laws that impeded the authority to deny or approve
conversions pursuant to FIRREA. 0 In reaching this decision, the
court emphasized the "primacy of the [flederal interest as regards the
solvency and viability of the [flederal deposit insurance system."10 9
Similarly, FIRREA's lease disaffirmance powers are impeded by the
state rent regulations restricting the exercise of those powers. The
Diamond court, however, neglected to consider the "primacy" of the
federal interest involved.
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman,110 the Second Circuit held that
the expansive nature of FIRREA's provisions governing property in-
terests preempted New York's statutorily conferred rights in such
property. The court found that "[FIRREA] superimposes a new ar-
rangement over the state law scheme, and alters ... the respective
rights and duties of the parties." '' This "new arrangement" was an
administrative process for adjudicating claims to which claimants
were required to submit before seeking relief in federal courts. 1 2 In
Elman, a firm had a retaining lien under New York law to the files of
a bank for which RTC had been appointed receiver.II3 The court
found that although the firm had a statutory right to the files, under
FIRREA the firm did not have a retaining lien, and FIRREA's provi-
sions preempted the New York law governing such liens. 4
The Diamond court found Elman to be inapposite because there,
the power to preempt New York law had been more clearly set forth
in FIRREA.II5 The cases are similar, however, in that the power to
disaffirm a lease does not distinguish between rent regulated and non-
rent regulated leases, and thus, the regulations are subject to preemp-
tion. Although a firm's statutory lien on a bank's files represents an
interest different from a statutory tenancy, the state rights conferred
in both situations conflict with FIRREA. Elman, therefore, serves to
106. Id. at 896; see 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464(i), (p).
107. The court found that state law was implicitly preempted and explicitly chose not
to decide the issue of express or conflict preemption. Smallwood, 925 F.2d at 898. The
court's discussion regarding the broadness of FIRREA's powers, however, is relevant in
determining whether the scope of FIRREA is sufficiently wide so as to expressly preempt
state law.
108. Id. at 898.
109. Id.
110. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1991).
111. Id. at 627.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 626.
114. See id. at 627.
115. See Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1162.
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illustrate the Second Circuit's interpretation of the broad powers con-
ferred on the Corporation pursuant to FIRREA.
3. Statutory Rights Not Outside The Scope of FIRREA
When a statutory right is premised on an agreement, such an agree-
ment should fall within the scope of FIRREA's disaffirmance powers.
Under both rent stabilization and rent control schemes, a contract
forms the basis of the landlord and tenant's relationship.116 That the
statutory tenancy rests on this contractual relationship has been rec-
ognized by both the Second Circuit and New York State courts.11 7
According to the New York Court of Appeals, "[r]ent control and
other landlord-tenant regulations ... merely involve restrictions on
existing tenancies."'11  Disaffirming the underlying lease removes the
basis for any statutory tenancy rights;' 9 once the lease is disaffirmed,
nothing remains to be restricted and all statutory rights cease to
exist. 120
The dependence of rent regulations on an underlying lease is partic-
ularly evident where rent stabilization regulations are at issue. Under
New York's rent stabilization regulations, tenants have the right to
renew their leases for a one or two year term.12 ' The tenant's occu-
pancy rights are inextricably connected to the underlying lease, and
thus repudiation of the lease extinguishes the rent stabilization regula-
tions governing it. Consequently, FIRREA regulations expressly pre-
empt the lease-dependent rent stabilization laws.
On the other hand, New York's rent control regulations provide
116. See, e.g., Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752, 753
(2d Cir.) (holding that nonconflicting provisions of lease are enforceable during term of
statutory tenancy), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Glauberman v. University Place
Apartments, Inc., 66 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (holding that tenant is statutory
tenant under State rent control regulations as to "term and rental obligation, but subject
to the rights and obligation of the lease not otherwise affected" and is bound by terms of
expired lease covenant against assignment and subletting without written consent of the
landlord), aff'd, 70 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div. 1947); Ten Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Baker, 179
N.Y.S.2d 288, 293 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1958) ("the tenant having been in possession under a
lease which expired ... continued in possession of the premises as a statutory tenant, the
terms and condition of said lease being projected into the statutory tenancy."), rev'd on
other grounds, 189 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
117. See MeCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752; Glauberman, 66 N.Y.S.2d
335; Ten Fifth Ave. Corp., 179 N.Y.S.2d 288.
118. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 105 (Ct. App.) (finding law
prohibiting demolition, alteration or conversion of single room occupancy properties and
obligating owners to restore properties and lease them at controlled rents indefinitely to
be facially invalid), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
119. See supra note 116.
120. See, e.g., Ten Fifth Ave. Corp., 179 N.Y.S.2d 288.
121. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, supra note 33, § 26-511 (c)(4).
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that a right to occupancy created pursuant to a rent controlled lease is
an interest independent of the lease.122 Thus, FIRREA does not ex-
pressly preempt rent control. In contrast, the rights conferred on ten-
ants under rent stabilized leases are expressly tied to the existence of
the lease.'
23
B. Conflict Preemption
1. Nature of the Conflict
Although FIRREA does not expressly preempt state rent control
regulations, such regulations are preempted to the extent that they
conflict with the Corporation's exercise of its liquidation powers
under FIRREA. In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La
Cuesta, the Supreme Court stated that where state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of
Congress ... state law is nullified to the extent that it actually con-
flicts with federal law."' 124 At issue in De La Cuesta was a regulation
enacted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the "Board") au-
thorizing federal savings and loans to include a due-on-sale clause 25
in their loan agreements. 26 The Court held that the Home Owner's
Loan Act expressly authorized the issuance of the regulation and that
the due-on-sale regulation preempted conflicting state limitations gov-
erning the exercise of such clauses. 127 The reasoning set forth in De
La Cuesta also applies to the rent control issue, since the preservation
of rent regulated leases clearly conflicts with the exercise of the Cor-
poration's lease disaffirmance powers.
The congressional instructions in FIRREA, 2 read in the context
of the statute as a whole, indicate that rent control regulations repre-
sent an "obstacle" to the accomplishment of FIRREA's intended pur-
poses. The continuing imposition of rent control regulations forces
the Corporation to liquidate properties below market value. This di-
122. See Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8602
(McKinney 1987).
123. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
124. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); see
also California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-101 (1989); Silkwood v. Kerr-Mc-
Gee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
125. A due-on-sale clause is a "provision that permits the association to declare the
entire balance of the loan immediately due and payable if the property securing the loan
is sold or otherwise transferred without the [lender's] prior written consent." De La
Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 141.
126. Id. at 146-47.
127. Id. at 141.
128. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(3)(C). For the text of § 1441a (b)(3)(C), see supra
note 13.
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rectly conflicts with Congress's instructions to "maximize the net
present value" from the sale of an institution's assets' 29 and to "mini-
mize the amount of loss" in either managing or selling the units. 130
RTC's internal policy, on the other hand, is more in line with
FIRREA's intended purposes.' 3'
In a policy statement setting forth RTC's interpretation of its lease
disaffirmance powers ("Policy Statement"), the RTC states that the
powers are only applicable to units that are not occupied by low- or
moderate-income tenants. 32 This interpretation abides by Congress's
instructions to preserve the supply of low- and moderate-income
housing. 3 3 This limitation diminishes the large adverse impact on the
housing market that the Diamond court feared. 34 Thus, in contrast
to Diamond's findings, 35 the Policy Statement's interpretation com-
plies with Congress's instructions to minimize the impact on local real
estate markets and to preserve the supply of affordable housing. 36
In addition to conflicting with Congress's policy, at least as to high-
income tenants, rent control renders lease disaffirmance powers mean-
ingless unless the tenancy can be terminated. Although rent regula-
tion is within the traditional police power of the states, 137 the Supreme
Court has stated that "the relative importance to the State of its own
law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal
129. See id. § 1441a (b)(3)(C)(i).
130. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a (b)(3)(C)(iv).
131. In a policy statement issued in February, 1991, the RTC declared that when it is
in possession of the burdensome leases of closed or insolvent thrifts, such leases will be
disaffirmed or repudiated if such action will promote the orderly administration of the
institution's affairs. If, however, the units are leased by low or moderate income tenants,
the RTC will not disaffirm or repudiate such leases. A low or moderate income tenant is
defined as a family or individual whose income does not exceed 115% of the median
income in the area involved, as determined by the U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, with adjustments for family size. After the disaffirmance or repudiation of
a lease, the RTC may, in its discretion, offer the units for sale to existing tenants or
negotiate other arrangements, provided recovery is maximized. If the existing tenants fail
to enter into an agreement acceptable to the RTC, the RTC will be free to take whatever
action it deems appropriate for the disposition of the units. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at
1154 n.1.
132. Id.
133. See § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(v). For the text of § 144la(b)(3)(C)(v), see supra note 13.
134. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1161.
135. Id. at 1161-62.
136. As of November 20, 1991, the RTC, in its capacity as conservator or receiver,
owned 274 rent regulated cooperative and condominium units which would be affected
by its Statement of Policy. See supra note 132; AfT. of John R. Gillespie, Asset Specialist
for the Northeast Consolidated Office of the RTC, Jan. 24, 1992, 3, Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. 1152*(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (No. 91-1631).
137. See Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1155-57.
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law." 1 38 Some courts, nonetheless, have weighed the importance to
the state of its own law in the initial determination of whether Con-
gress intended preemption. 139
The Diamond court cited Rowe v. Pierce, 'I which was decided by
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, for the
proposition that there was a presumption against the preemption of
state rent regulations.14' In Rowe, Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") regulations,'42 which were promulgated
under the authority of the National Housing Act, required tenants to
sign a HUD lease as a condition of continued occupancy in property
foreclosed upon by HUD.'43 This requirement, however, directly
contravened the District of Columbia's rent regulations, which stated
that unless the regulation provided otherwise no tenant could be
evicted from a rental unit as long as the tenant continued to pay the
rent. 144
The tenants in Rowe had signed a favorable three-year lease with
their landlord, who subsequently defaulted on a mortgage insured by
HUD. 145 HUD foreclosed on the property and sought to limit the
lease to one year. HUD argued that its authority derived from the
National Housing Act, which provided that if HUD was preparing
property for sale, the continued occupancy of all tenants was tempo-
rary and subject to termination.146 HUD took the position that if the
tenant failed to execute a HUD lease at a fair market price, HUD
could take "appropriate eviction action."'147
The court in Rowe found no preemption, since there was no evi-
dence of congressional intent to preempt, and since HUD's regulation
was not a "reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies" with
respect to the tenants and HUD.'48 The court went on to state that it
would not "lightly conclude that the federal government should be
permitted to enhance the value of its property for quick sale by frus-
trating local law [and] extinguishing the tenants' protections against
138. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
139. See, e.g., Rowe v. Pierce, 622 F. Supp. 1030 (D.D.C. 1985).
140. Id.
141. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. at 1162.
142. 24 C.F.R. § 203.670 (1992).
143. Rowe, 622 F. Supp. at 1031.
144. District of Columbia Rental Housing Act of 1985, § 501(a), 32 D.C. Reg. 3089
(1985).
145. Rowe, 622 F. Supp. at 1031.
146. 24 C.F.R. § 203.679 (1992).
147. Id.
148. Rowe, 622 F. Supp. at 1032 (citations omitted).
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eviction....
Diamond's reliance on Rowe, however, was misplaced. First,
FIRREA differs from the National Housing Act because, unlike
FIRREA, "[n]othing in the [National Housing Act] or [its] legislative
history indicat[ed] any congressional intent to preempt state property
and contract law."' 50 Second, the court in Rowe found that HUD's
previous acquiescence to local law with respect to its mortgages and
insurance had created a continuing obligation to observe local law. 5'
Third, HUD's powers under the National Housing Act were not
granted pursuant to an emergency mandate; the Corporation, in con-
trast, acts pursuant to FIRREA's emergency mandate when it seeks
to preempt rent regulated tenancies. 5 2 Finally, whereas the court in
Rowe found that the National Housing Act did not provide a reason-
able accomodation of conflicting policies, Congress's statutory in-
structions in FIRREA provide a "reasonable accommodation" of the
conflicting interests of the tenants by limiting the impact on low- and
moderate-income tenants.
2. The Agency Standard Applied To Conflict Preemption
The court in Diamond imposed its own construction of FIRREA
upon the RTC, narrowly reading RTC's powers so that no conflict
would be found between rent regulations and the statute. This
method of reasoning, however, ignores the deference that should have
been accorded to RTC's interpretation of FIRREA.I53 Had the court
deferred to the Policy Statement, it would have found conflict
preemption.
The Diamond court should have applied the more deferential
agency standard'54 to the Policy Statement.'55 FIRREA expressly
confers agency status on RTC.'56 The appropriate standards for re-
149. Id. at 1033.
150. Id. at 1032.
151. Id.
152. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 104.
153. See supra note 131.
154. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 131.
156. The RTC is an "instrumentality" of the United States. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a
(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. IV 1993).
The Corporation shall be deemed to be an agency of the United States for pur-
poses of subchapter II of chapter 5 and chapter 7 of Title 5 when it is acting as a
corporation. The Corporation shall be deemed to be an agency of the United
States to the same extent as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation when it
is acting as a conservator or receiver of an insured depository institution.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. IV 1993). Subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5
provides that an "agency means each authority of the Government of the United States,
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view of agency actions and interpretations are set forth in the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act157 and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 158 According to the Administrative
Procedure Act, which governs judicial review of federal agency ac-
tion, an agency's decision may be set aside if the decision is (1) an
abuse of discretion or contrary to law, or (2) in excess of statutory
authority.159 The standard for reviewing an agency's interpretation of
a statute it administers was set forth by the Supreme Court in Chev-
ron. There, the Court described the proper standard of review where
Congress has not spoken directly to the issue:
[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
baed on a permissible construction of the statute... Such [inter-
pretations] are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.., a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrattor of an
agency.'6o
Therefore, if the congressional intent underlying FIRREA is not
clear, then a court's analysis of RTC's lease disaffirmance powers
must be limited to whether RTC's interpretation, as expressed in
its Policy Statement,' 6' is reasonable in light of Congress's
instructions. 62
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency." Administrative Pro-
cedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1988).
157. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (1992).
158. Chevron US.A., Inc., 467 U.S. 837.
159. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A) & (C). Section A also provides for review of agency ac-
tions which are arbitrary and capricious, but this is not an issue since FIRREA contains
protections for low and moderate income tenants, and RTC seeks to disaffirm the leases
of those with higher incomes because they have the ability to pay for higher rents.
160. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cedarminn Bldg. Ltd.
Partner, 956 F.2d 1446, 1450-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 94 (1992); Colorado
State Banking Bd. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 926 F.2d 931, 936 (10th Cir. 1991); Securi-
ties Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47, 52-53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1059 (1988).
161. See supra note 131.
162. Although an interpretation of a statute expressed in a policy statement is not as
authoritative as a regulation (as was the case in Chevron), it is still entitled to deference.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Com'n., 506 F.2d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see
also Grocery Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1002 (2d Cir.) (finding the
distinction between formal rules and interpretive rules or general statements of policy to
be vague, but the latter being entitled to judicial respect if a reasonable interpretation),
aff'd, 474 U.S. 801 (1985). Such interpretations "constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment," the weight of which depends upon "the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
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The Policy Statement did not offer an unreasonable interpretation
of Congress's intent. First, as discussed earlier, 6 ' RTC's position
that the power to disaffirm a lease encompasses the landlord-tenant
relationship comports with the common usage of the term "lease."
Second, in accordance with the congressional instruction 164 to maxi-
mize the supply of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income
tenants, RTC adopted the policy of not disaffirming any lease that
was held by low- or moderate-income tenants. 165  Finally, where the
lease was held by a higher income tenant, RTC could either offer to
sell the unit to the existing tenant or negotiate another arrangement,
provided however, that the sale or renegotiation complied with the
congressional instructions to maximize recovery. 166 Only after an ex-
isting higher income tenant has refused either of these options would
RTC become free to dispose of the unit.'67
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. ,161 the Supreme Court stated the standard for
finding an agency's interpretation "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly
contrary to the statute."' 169 Under this standard, RTC's interpreta-
tion must be applied unless RTC
relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem [or]
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evi-
dence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. 70
RTC's interpretation of its lease disaffirmance powers is not unreason-
able under the State Farm standard. It is a reasonable construction of
Congress's instructions, 7 ' and accommodates the competing policies
underlying rent regulation and the need to liquidate assets at minimal
taxpayer expense. Tenants who can afford to pay market rates may
have their subsidized leases repudiated in preparation for an asset
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
163. Supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
164. 12 U.S.C. § 144la(b)(3)(C)(v). For the text of § 1441a (b)(3)(C)(v), see note 13.
165. Supra note 131.
166. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a (b)(3)(C)(i), (iii) and (v). See supra note 131 for the text of
§ 1441a(b)(3)(C)(i).
167. See supra note 131.
168. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
169. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
170. Id.; Soler v. G & U, Inc., 833 F.2d 1104, 1107 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 832 (1988).
171. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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sale; however, the leases of low- or moderate-income tenants, who
would be more adversely affected by displacement, are not subject to
repudiation. Thus, under the Supreme Court's decision in State
Farm, RTC's interpretation should survive judicial challenge.
Colorado State Banking Board v. Resolution Trust Corp. 172 illus-
trates an application of the Chevron standard for review of an
agency's interpretation of a statute. In Colorado, the Tenth Circuit
determined that FIRREA authorized RTC to override the state
branch-banking laws. 7 3 The issue arose because RTC had relied
upon FIRREA174 and promulgated a regulation that preempted state
banking laws which had prohibited banks from operating failed thrift
offices as bank branches.17
The State, contending that preemption was not warranted, had as-
serted that no absolute conflict between state and federal law existed
since RTC was not required to contravene state law by marketing the
failed thrift as a bank branch.'76 Instead, the state argued, the conflict
between FIRREA and state law was avoidable since the acquired of-
fices could have been marketed as thrift subsidiaries or as indepen-
dently chartered and capitalized banks. 77
The court observed that RTC possessed broad authority to issue
interpretive rules, regulations, policies, guidelines, and statements
that RTC considered necessary to carry out its statutory purpose."'
The court found that although other marketing options were avail-
able, the RTC was not required to choose an alternative simply to
avoid conflict with state law, where the alternative risked impeding
the fulfillment of RTC's statutory mandate. 79
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning applies as well to the RTC's position
that it may repudiate leases without regard to the existence of statu-
tory tenancies. 8' The RTC should not be required to act contrary to
its statutory mandate to maximize revenues simply because the RTC
can sell rent regulated units without repudiating the corresponding
leases.
172. Colorado State Banking Bd. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 926 F.2d 931, 936 (10th
Cir. 199 1).
173. Id. at 936.
174. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(k) (Supp. IV 1993).
175. Colorado State Banking Bd., 926 F.2d at 937; see also Arkansas State Bank
Comm'r v. Resolution Trust Corp., 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding RTC pre-
emption of regulations for state bank branching laws under 12 U.S.C § 1823(k)).
176. Colorado State Banking Bd., 926 F.2d at 938.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 945 (interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(12)(A)).
179. See id.
180. See supra note 131.
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3. Objections to Agency Deference
According deference to RTC's interpretation of its lease disaffirm-
ance powers might raise jurisdictional objections. 8 ' In Adams Fruit
Co. v. Barrett,'8 2 the Supreme Court recently stated that "an agency
may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdic-
tion....3 Under FIRREA, RTC's interpretation of its lease disaffirm-
ance powers may be construed as either 1) an authorized application
of the Corporation's powers or 2) an expansion of the Corporation's
jurisdiction. Justices White and Scalia have indicated that where such
an ambiguity exists, deference to the agency's interpretation is both
necessary and appropriate."8 4 The Supreme Court has deferred to an
agency's interpretation of its own powers so long as the interpretation
does not expand the agency's authority into broad, new areas of regu-
lation. 85 Even if RTC's interpretation would have the effect of ex-
panding its jurisdiction, it is still entitled to deference since the
expansion of jurisdiction would be, at most, marginal. RTC's inter-
pretation confirms the Corporation's power to disaffirm rent regulated
leases without state interference. The interpretation does not grant
the power to regulate tenancies; nor does it extend beyond leasehold
arrangements. RTC's interpretation of its lease disaffirmance powers
does not attempt to expand into a broad, new area of regulation.
Therefore, the jurisdictional objections discussed in Adams Fruit
181. See generally Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2097-2101 (1990).
182. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
183. Id. at 650 (1990); see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. I.C.C., 850 F.2d 694, 699 n.6
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (acknowledging that special concerns are raised when an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute increases its own authority or jurisdiction).
184. See Dole v. Steelworkers of Amer., 494 U.S. 26, 54 (1990) (White, J., dissenting);
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 377-83 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
Giving deference to an administrative interpretation of its statutory jurisdiction
or authority is both necessary and appropriate. It is necessary because there is
no discernible line between an agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's
exceeding authorized application of its authority. To exceed authorized applica-
tion is to exceed authority .... Deference is appropriate because it is consistent
with the general rationale for deference: Congress would naturally expect that
the agency would be responsible, within broad limits, for resolving ambiguities
in its statutory jurisdiction or authority.
Id.; Sunstein, supra note 181, at 2097.
185. Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-92 (1988) (deferring to Customs
Service interpretation of its power to regulate "gray market goods" infringing on trade-
mark rights); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Commercial Office Prods. Co.,
486 U.S. 107, 115 (1987) (deferring to EEOC interpretation of statute governing timely
filing of complaints).
1993] FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF RENT REGULATION 961
Co. 18 6 are inapplicable.
Another possible objection is that RTC's policy statement, which
set forth its interpretation of section 1821(c)(2)(C),'87 was not sub-
jected to the formal notice and comment proceedings that are re-
quired for rulemaking. Since policy statements may be adopted
without public participation, the scope of judicial review for such in-
terpretations may be broader than for a rule adopted pursuant to for-
mal rulemaking proceedings. 88
In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,8 9 the Supreme Court
refused to defer to an agency's "convenient litigating position."' 90
RTC's Policy Statement, however, rises above an interpretation of-
fered by an attorney at trial. The Policy Statement is based on the
expertise of the agency. As the Supreme Court has stated, an
agency's interpretation constitutes "a body of experience and in-
formed judgment," the weight of which depends upon "the thorough-
ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those fac-
tors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."' 9'
Although an interpretation of a statute expressed in a policy state-
ment is not subject to the same notice and comment proceedings as a
regulation, it is still entitled to deference. 92
D. Policy Considerations
Congress recognized the troubled state of the thrift industry as a
national problem. 93  In response, Congress set forth in FIRREA a
framework for a federal program to be administered by the Corpora-
tion.' "94 The efficient functioning of the thrift industry is integral to
the health of the housing industry and to maintaining a viable system
of affordable housing throughout the country. 95 Allowing higher-in-
come tenants to continue to occupy their rent regulated dwellings at
186. Adams Fruit Co., 110 S. Ct. 1384, 1390-91.
187. See supra note 132.
188. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir.
1974)
189. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
190. Id. at 474.
191. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
192. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 40; see also Grocery Mfrs. of America, Inc. v.
Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1002 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding the distinction between formal rules
and interpretive rules or general statements of policy to be vague, but the latter being
entitled to judicial respect if a reasonable interpretation).
193. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 100-05.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 103-05.
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below market rates results in a transfer of the Corporation's posses-
sory interest in the units to these tenants. 196 This lack of a possessory
interest on the part of the Corporation makes the rent regulated units
less attractive to potential investors in a liquidation sale. This clearly
impedes the Corporation's ability to maximize the net present value of
the assets of failed thrift institutions, resulting in wasted taxpayer
dollars.
The protection extended to a tenant under rent regulation must be
comparable with the extent of the emergency. 97 The New York State
Legislature's recent decontrol of luxury units is indicative of a grow-
ing awareness that rent control has benefitted all classes and not just
the needy. Although the luxury units of certain wealthy tenants have
been decontrolled,' 98 higher income tenants still reap the subsidies
from their rent regulated units.' 99 These higher-income tenants, who
tend to occupy the more expensive units, benefit from larger rent sav-
ings than low- and moderate-income tenants under rent regula-
tions.2" Higher-income tenants do not need the protection afforded
by rent regulation and should therefore be given the option of either
purchasing their properties from the Corporation at market value,
paying the market rental cost of the units, or moving to another resi-
dence. These options would prevent higher-income tenants from hav-
ing their housing subsidized by taxpayers.
Governments traditionally have met the needs of those who cannot
afford to pay "reasonable prices" for necessities through the distribu-
tion of taxpayer funds, either in the form of cash subsidies or in-kind
benefits.20 The provision of basic necessities has been found to be a
burden which, in the interests of fairness, ought to be borne by the
public as a whole.20 2 Few, however, would argue that nonincentive
subsidies provided at taxpayer expense to those with higher incomes
forward any clear policy interest. Therefore, whenever the federal
government's interest conflicts with state and local rent regulations,
196. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Hall
v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988).
197. Glauberman v. University Place Apartments, 66 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (Sup. Ct.
1946).
198. See Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993, ch. 253, § 2, 1993 N.Y. LAWS 675
(McKinney 1993).
199. See supra note 42.
200. In 1987, one-quarter of rent regulated households with incomes above the New
York City mean family income accounted for approximately half of total subsidies due to
rent regulation. RENT CONTROL REPORT, supra note 27, at 13, 16, 18.
201. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1988).
202. Id. at 22.
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such an interest should not be subordinate to those of higher income
tenants benefitting under rent regulation.
V. Conclusion
The savings and loan crisis has had a significant impact on the na-
tional deficit, interest rates, employment, and the economy as a whole.
The Corporation has a vital role in the resolution of the savings and
loan crisis; if it were forced to halt its resolution activities, the bank-
ing structure of the United States would be tremendously weakened
as undercapitalized banks would continue to cause instability
throughout the entire banking system.
Rather than acknowledge the Corporation's power to preempt state
rent regulations that interfere with its ability to disaffirm the leases of
higher-income tenants, the court in Diamond imposed its own con-
struction of FIRREA on the Corporation. In effect, the court author-
ized rent subsidies for those who need them least. Furthermore, the
court contravened section 1821(j)2 °3 which, at a minimum, should
have curtailed the court from restraining RTC in the exercise of its
congressional mandate.
When courts restrain the Corporation's efforts to resolve the sav-
ings and loan crisis, the taxpayers absorb the cost. The public's best
interest, therefore requires that courts recognize the Corporation's
broad power. To further aid the courts in their interpretation of
FIRREA, Congress should explicitly address the Corporation's abil-
ity to preempt state regulations under section 1821(c)(2)(C) 2° by de-
fining the term "lease," as used in section 1821(e)(1), 20 5 to encompass
the occupancy rights held by tenants under rent regulated leases.
Even without a direct Congressional statement on the matter, courts
should recognize the broad scope of the Corporation's lease disaffirm-
ance powers.
Eric William Hess
203. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(j). For the text of § 1821(j), see supra note 78.
204. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e)(1). For the text of § 1821(e)(1), see supra note 15.
205. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(C). For the text of § 1821(c)(2)(C), see supra note 16.

